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THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Philip C. Kissam*
all literature is to me me**
Gertrude Stein

Researchers, readers, academic committees, law school deans,
research agencies, and editors of publications frequently evaluate
works of legal scholarship. As manifest in the many writings on contemporary legal scholarship, this evaluation process has become more
contentious and less certain.' The immediate causes of this fragmentation are not difficult to determine. They include a new diversity in
types of legal scholarship,' the rising expectations of administrators
and promotion committees that law faculty publish often and in prestigious places, a dramatic expansion in the quantity of legal scholarship, and the consequent competition for publication in prestigious
journals and books.3
We have evaluated legal scholarship traditionally on an implicit
basis with unquestioned*assumptions about the values, purposes, and
methods of this scholarship. Typically, we assume that scholarship
should focus on legal doctrine, employ conventional methods of legal
analysis and argument, and be useful to practitioners, or at least to
appellate advocates and the courts.4 We also tend to evaluate scholar* Professor of Law, University of Kansas; B.A. 1963, Amherst College; LL.B. 1968, Yale
University. I am thankful to Sandy McKenzie, Peter Schanck, and Joan Wellman for their
helpful comments on drafts of this paper and to Laura Fine and Kathy Reavis for their research
assistance. Funds for this project were provided by the University of Kansas General Research
Fund and the Gensman Fund, University of Kansas School of Law.
** Letter from Gertrude Stein to Edmund Wilson (Mar. 10, 1923), in 1 THE LETTERS OF
GERTRUDE STEIN AND CARL VAN VECHTEN, 1913-35, at 88 n.1 (E. Bums ed. 1986).
1. See, eg., Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); Cramton,
"The Most Remarkable Institution'". The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1986);
Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law
Reviewsl, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 317 (1985); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1307 (1979);
Hutchinson, IndianaDworkin and Law's Empire (Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 637 (1987).
2. See, eg., R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's
TO THE 1980's 270-75 (1983); American Legal Scholarship: Directions and Dilemmas, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1983); Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Legal
Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes,90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981).
3. See Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism. 134 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 268-71
(1986).
4. See H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 32-33 (1972);
Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of the
Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1930); Nowak, supra note 1, at 321-24; Rodell, Goodbye to
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ship intuitively and in general terms. Without defining terms or demonstrating how certain standards are met, works of scholarship are
characterized as "original," insightful," and "outstanding," or conversely as "unimaginative," mechanical," and "routine." Today, these
assumptions, these practices, and some equally parochial preferences
for the values and methods of new approaches to legal scholarship
appear to limit our abilities to read, to understand, to appreciate, and
to employ the pluralistic modes of inquiry that are present in, and
available to, contemporary legal scholarship. 5
The evaluation process requires new perspectives to enhance our
writing, reading, and formal evaluation of legal scholarship. The diversity of modern scholarship invites us to engage in a more flexible and
more reflective reading and evaluation process that appreciates multiple perspectives and gives explicit attention to the different values,
purposes, methods, and contexts of each individual work. This evaluation process would recognize and promote the legitimacy of pluralistic modes of research, analysis, and writing, thus improving the
fairness of evaluations and possibly the quality of much contemporary
scholarship. These improvements could affect both scholarship which
is designed to assist legal practitioners directly and scholarship with a
more academic cast. In general, we need to construct a new language
or understanding of contemporary legal scholarship. This essay is a
step in that direction. 6
To avoid begging some important questions, I employ a rather
broad and open-ended definition of scholarship. "Legal scholarship"
will refer to any writing about the law or legal process that is printed
in a form generally recognized as "a legal publication." This practicebased definition is consistent with the basic theme of this essay: that
readers of legal scholarship should become more flexible and more
Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962); Rotunda, Law Reviews-The Extreme
Centrist Position, 62 IND. L. '. 1 (1986).
5. Cf Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1982) (describing a similar
situation in the evaluation of legal history scholarship).
6. Cf R.J. BERNSTEIN,
BEYOND
OBJECTIVISM
AND
RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE.
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983) (arguing for a pluralistic model of rationality, which Is
historically situated and based on the construction of dialogic communities rather than
foundational principles of truth or method); R.J. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCISt
AND POLITICAL THEORY, at xiv (1976) (arguing that "[an adequate. comprehensive political
and social theory must be at once empirical, interpretative, and critical."); W.C. BOOTH.
CRITICAl

UNDERSTANDING: THE POWERS AND LtMI'FS OF PI URAI.ISM (1979) (arguing for the

legitimacy of pluralism, as distinct from relativism, in literary criticism). See generally Frug.
McCarthyisin and CriticalLegal Studies. 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665 (1987) (calling for an

open academic debate in law schools over issues of academic freedom, structures, and methods of
teaching and scholarship).

The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship
explicit in considering the diverse values, purposes, subjects, and
methods of contemporary legal writing. A university-based definition
of scholarship might require certain kinds of research, particular
methods of analysis, and most importantly, the discovery of knowledge.7 But this definition excludes much writing about the law that
traditionally has been published and considered valuable by the legal
profession. Consider, for example, the publication of teaching materials, continuing education materials, survey articles, and student casenotes that primarily involve the dissemination rather than discovery of
knowledge. These kinds of writing may be useful to diverse professional audiences. I thus prefer to include this writing within a broad
practice-based definition of legal scholarship, and to examine it under
standards of value, quality, and importance, rather than exclude it
merely as a matter of definition. The law school, after all, is a creature
of both the university and the legal profession, and in a pluralistic
world the university law school should be able to serve both university
and professional missions.
This essay is in five parts. I consider first the diversity of social and
personal values that scholarship can serve. I then analyze the more
specific purposes of legal scholarship, the methods by which these purposes may be achieved, and a variety of perspectives from which
evaluators assess or should assess legal scholarship. Finally, I shall try
to explain why our evaluation of scholarship lags behind the development of the new pluralism in legal scholarship. In sum, if we are to
understand and to assess our evaluation practices, we must consider
the complex values, different purposes, diverse methods, shifting perspectives, and any social or political obstacles to the effective evaluation of contemporary legal scholarship.
A DIVERSITY OF VALUES
Let us imagine a philosopher who contemplates a universe of
problems in order to choose a research project. This universe might
include the morality of nuclear arms, 8 the theories of social justice,9
racial discrimination and affirmative action," the moral basis of contract law," and other issues with a narrower focus. Suppose that our
7. See, e.g., Kronman, Foreward:Legal Scholarship and MoralEducation, 90 YALE L.J. 955,
967-68 (1981); Nelson, supra note 5, at 448-51.
8. See, e.g., J.S. NYE JR., NUCLEAR ETHICS (1986).
9. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
10. See, e.g., R.K. GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
(1979).
11. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
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philosopher decides to analyze a problem of very limited scope, say,
the morality of hospital decisions that grant or deny patient admitting
12
privileges to physicians who wish to join a hospital's medical staff.
What values might this project serve?
One value or motive might be play. Our philosopher might hope to
obtain sheer pleasure by attempting to resolve the conflicts between
competing moral principles and the different perspectives of physicians, patients, and administrators. Alternatively, our philosopher
may wish to exorcise the threatening shadows of some personal experience that involved hospital staff privileges and the welfare of his or her
family. Or our philosopher may obtain pleasure by competing successfully with others who analyze the same issues. In other words,
this philosopher may view scholarship in part or even primarily as a
13

game or ritual.
Of course, the play factor may be quite personal to the investigator,
and by itself may not justify publication of a paper or a favorable
assessment of the project. Even so, the value of play constitutes an
important if only partial explanation of much scholarship. An
author's choice of an unusual subject, a unique method, or seemingly
bizarre style could all result from this play factor. Understanding this
may help readers understand and appreciate the substantive insights
that an author is trying to convey through playful scholarship.' 4 In
addition, researchers, and evaluators with an interest in the well-being
of the scholar, might consider play a positive factor in assessing the
role and value of playful scholarship in a researcher's career. Perhaps
some playful scholarship should be appreciated simply because it helps
one pursue a career of teaching and research with enthusiasm. This
factor alone would not justify publication of the writing, but publication is really only one aspect of evaluation. Finally, playful scholar12. Cf Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the
Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1982) (analyzing hospital staff privilege decisions
for possible antitrust violations).
13. See also Mitgang, John Braine, British Novelist and Playwright, Dead at 64, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1986, at 49 (quoting from an interview with Braine: "Let this be my epitaph: As a writer,
I never tried to please anybody but myself."); cf J. HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF
THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE 76-88 (1944) (describing the elements of play in lawsuits);
Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 994-1005 (1978) (describing legal trials as games).
14. See also Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259. 360-88 (1987)
(describing Jacque Derrida's deconstructive play with texts and the influence of deconstruction
on critical legal studies scholarship). Compare Luban, Legal Modernism. 84 MICH. L. REV.
1656, 1670-75 (1986) (describing the use of play by critical legal studies scholars to reveal and
criticize the implicit presuppositions of mainstream legal scholarship) with Posner, The Decline
of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761. 768 (1987)
(characterizing the same scholarship as "sheer infantilism").
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ship may delight or inspire other readers, and this is surely another
important value.15
A second value or motive could be that our philosopher's work connects to larger projects, even though the particular work lacks
independent value. For example, an analysis of hospital privilege decisions, by itself, might not provide a practically useful discussion
because it fails to consider these decisions within a sufficiently expansive context of hospital, professional, and moral practices. This analysis may simply order complex facts and relationships that would be
most useful to the analysis of related but larger problems. In such
cases, however, the analysis of hospital staff privileges could be helpful
to our philosopher's teaching of applied moral philosophy or the ethics
of health care. The analysis also might inform or inspire scholarly
work on larger and more valuable projects, say for example, the study
of medical credentialing 6 or collective professional behavior. 7
These connections, alone, may not justify the publication of many
papers. Two qualifications, however, should be noted. In special
cases, scholarly fragments or partial works may provide such valuable
insights that publication is appropriate. 8 More frequently, the publication of incomplete or partial works may encourage dialogue between
readers and writers that enriches subsequent writing. This sort of publication enlarges the audience of both sympathetic and critical readers
who can, by their comments, play a significant role in the development
of a writer's thought.1 9 In any event, the readers and formal evaluators of scholarship will be aided by focusing on a work's possible connections to other projects. A reader is more likely to understand and
appreciate an author's goals, methods, and insights by placing a particular work in the context of the author's other publications, the relevant literature, and the reader's own projects. In sum, this focus on
connections should encourage readers and evaluators to become more
active participants in the reading, interpretation, and evaluation of
15. See, eg., Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984);
Hutchinson, supra note 1.
16. Cf Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and Certification: The
Antitrust Laws and OtherProcompetitive Strategies, 1983 Wis. L. REV. I (analyzing government
policies concerning medical credentialing programs).
17. Cf Kissam, Antitrust Law and Professional Behavior, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1983)
(analyzing collective professional behavior for possible antitrust violations).
18. See, e.g., L. WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOK: PRELIMINARY STUDIES
FOR THE "PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS" (1958).
19. See, e.g., P. ELBOW, WRITING WITH POWER: TECHNIQUES FOR MASTERING THE
WRITING PROCESS 139-45, 264-77 (1983).
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scholarship, and this in turn should encourage explicit rather than
implicit evaluation of modern legal scholarship.2 °
A third value or motive for our philosopher's project could be
understanding, that is, the illumination of an interesting and difficult
problem. The development of an investigator's understanding, by
itself, would not seem to generate any social value that deserves to be
recognized in evaluating scholarship. Readers, however, may wish to
advance their understanding of complex problems such as hospital
staff privilege decisions. Furthermore, both the investigator and readers may, in currently undetermined ways, be able to apply a new
understanding of hospital staff privileges to other projects. The value
or motive of understanding, even of such a relatively limited topic
such as hospital staff privileges, may thus generate scholarship that
deserves positive evaluation and publication, even if on first impression
the project does not appear to have any direct or immediate practical
value.2 1
A fourth value may be the project's direct practical usefulness. This
value underlies the previous ones, but in the earlier situations the possibility of practical value was indirect or more speculative than the
values of play, connectedness, and understanding. Here we focus on
the two practical dimensions of academic scholarship. First, this
scholarship, if original and done well, may help a scholar earn tenure,
increased salary, prestige, and other rewards in academic and professional communities. Second, this scholarship may assist readers, who,
for example, teach medical ethics or wish to make informed hospital
staff privilege decisions.
Several points about the direct practical value of academic scholarship are worth noting. Unlike prior values, this value requires readers,
and thus practical scholarship presumably should be written for particular audiences. In many instances, however, the value of serving
oneself and the value of serving others may involve different audiences.
This may create a dilemma for our philosopher. On the one hand, to
write for academic rewards may mean writing for analytical philosophers in the department and external evaluators who demand an analysis that relies upon the most recent philosophical literature,
principles, and analytical procedures. On the other hand, to write for
20. Cf Grinols, CriticalReading and Learning in College, in

CRITICAl, THINKING: READING

ACROSS THE CURRICUILUM 21-31 (A.B. Grinols ed. 1984) (contrasting instrumental and critical

reading); Kissam, Thikhig (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REv. 135, 138-41
(1987) (contrasting instrumental and critical reading by law students).
21. Cf Rotunda, supra note 4, at 3 (most law review scholarship is not immediately useful.
but is stored on library shelves to await the day when it has use).
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teachers of medical ethics or health care practitioners, the author may
need to employ a more concrete and straightforward analysis of the
different kinds of hospital privilege decisions. Of course, our philosopher could write two articles on the same subject, but this might not
be very interesting, would certainly take extra time, and only one
might be published. This dilemma should be recognized by both the
writers and evaluators of practical scholarship. If this dilemma is not
addressed, chaos in the writing and in the evaluation process are likely
to result because neither writer nor reader will be sure of the writer's
particular audience or language. In sum, we write for specific audiences much of the time, and we may need to tailor our evaluations of
much practical scholarship with this factor of audience constantly in
mind.22
A fifth value of our philosopher's work could be theoretical significance.2 3 For example, the project could illuminate the basic or underlying moral principles implicated in hospital staff privilege decisions.
A work of theoretical significance provides a certain kind of understanding and may often be connected directly or ultimately to practical values. By "theoretical significance," however, I refer to the less
frequent but more important works of scholarship that change our
way of thinking about the basic principles involved in difficult intellectual issues, in this case, the morality of hospital staff privilege decisions. As with practical usefulness, this value'requires readers. Again,
our philosopher may face a significant dilemma about the appropriate
audience or audiences to reach and to influence. In a work of theoretical significance, this dilemma may be particularly severe if the work
implicates multiple theoretical perspectives and thus invites writing
for multiple audiences.
The previous values may be viewed as the ultimate ends or values of
academic scholarship. The achievement of these values depends upon
an author satisfying certain intermediate values or standards of scholarship. The first two of these standards are necessary for what we
typically refer to as "good scholarship." Other intermediate standards
demark our relative and rough distinctions between "good," "important," and "outstanding" academic scholarship.
22. See generally P. ELBOW, supra note 19, at 177-215.
23. Cf M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR

BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 1-4 (1986) (contrasting doctrinal legal scholarship with the
scholarship of legal theory); Cavers, The Evaluation of Research Proposals, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC.
212, 213-14 (1970) (describing the dimensions of significant law and social science research
proposals as those of social significance, practical significance, and theoretical significance).
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First, a scholarly work must in some sense be original. In many
disciplines, this standard can only be satisfied by the presentation of
newly discovered knowledge, of a new interpretation of a difficult
issue, or a new solution to some intellectual problem. 24 But existing
knowledge can be disseminated or reported in original ways, and such
writing could satisfy a broadly conceived standard of originality.
Although the dissemination of knowledge, by itself, will not be of theoretical significance, it can promote understanding and be of direct
practical usefulness to readers. These latter values may not count for
much in academic disciplines such as philosophy, but the dissemination of knowledge in an original manner may often be of considerable
value to professional audiences. These audiences frequently obtain
and use knowledge in a variety of ways, and the dissemination of
knowledge in an immediately useful form may have a considerable
impact on the application of knowledge to professional problems. I
would thus allow the dissemination of knowledge in an original manner to satisfy the originality standard for scholarship in a professional
discipline like law.2
Second, our philosopher's work must also demonstrate some degree
of competence or quality. We typically recognize and express this
standard in such amorphous terms as "this is quality work" or "this
writing is of highest quality." Unfortunately, we often fail to define
our standards for competence or quality. 26 Following William Nelson's proposed standards for "minimal scholarly competence" in legal
history scholarship,2 7 we might consider the quality standard for academic scholarship to place the following demands on writers. Any
valuable scholarship must be factually accurate, written in a comprehensible manner, and be based on appropriate methods, be they
research, analytical, interpretive, or narrative, which are designed to
achieve the scholar's purposes.
Third, scholarly work that is original and competent may or may
not be "important." Academic conversations that distinguish between
merely good and important scholarship suggest that the concept of
important scholarship has at least two meanings. Important scholarship may have a relatively broad scope and thus a potential impact
upon the lives and work of many persons. Important scholarship may
also involve the analysis and resolution of particularly difficult intel24. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 448-51.
25. See supra text accompanying note 7; infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
26. Cf Nelson, supra note 5 (arguing that this situation exists in the evaluation of legal
history scholarship).
27. See id. at 478-85, 490-91.
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lectual issues. For example, the morality of nuclear arms, as a subject,
would support important work in both senses." The morality of hospital privilege decisions, by contrast, might support important scholarship only if the work involved the analysis and successful resolution of
complex or difficult intellectual issues.
As a matter of degree, but in distinction to important scholarship,
some writing may be characterized as "influential" or "outstanding"
scholarship. This is writing that substantially affects the behavior of
others or causes others to change fundamentally how they think about
difficult issues.2 9 Not all scholarship can or should be expected to
achieve this standard. Outstanding scholarship typically involves high
risk work that is based on substantial research, long-term training, a
wealth of previous experience, and the use of unconventional
methods.30
When applying this standard, however, there are some relatively
objective, external kinds of evidence that can and should be used to
measure the influence of any particular work. We can measure the
traces of scholarship in the work of others, even though we may
debate vigorously whether the traces of a scholar's influence should be
31
measured primarily in quantitative or qualitative terms.
We should observe, finally, that many of the values of an individual
work of scholarship, especially its practical or theoretical significance,
originality, importance, and influence, will depend upon relationships
between the work and related texts. In philosophy, these texts include
other works on the same subject, other works on analogous subjects,
and leading works on the fundamental principles or theories that our
philosopher employs or should employ when treating the morality or
hospital staff privileges. In law, the related texts will typically include
not only the relevant secondary literature and related disciplines but
statutes, legislative histories, cases, and the social history. This means,
of course, that an effective evaluation of a scholarly work, if it satisfies
28. See, e.g., J.S. NYE, supra note 8.
29. Cf Nelson, supranote 5, at 485-90 (describing "outstanding" legal history scholarship as
that which has a certain lack of conventionality and a certain measure of influence).
30. See Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399,
402-03 (1956) (encouraging legal scholars to work patiently on new kinds of extra-doctrinal
scholarship by working carefully with interdisciplinary ideas, and by building one's techniques of
inquiry slowly by successive pilot studies); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90
YALE L. J. 1205, 1221-22 (noting that legal scholars need substantial amounts of time to develop
an understanding of social theory that might usefully be employed in extra-doctrinal legal
scholarship).
31. Compare Nelson, supra note 5, at 489-90 (articulating qualitative measures of the
influence of outstanding legal history scholarship) with Rotunda, supra note 4, at 7 (measuring
the influence of legal scholarship by the number of citations it receives).
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our standards of minimal competence, usually must be grounded on a
substantial knowledge of the relevant texts. In academic law, however,
with our traditions of a highly specialized faculty, an orientation
towards practice rather than scholarship, and student-edited law
reviews, the effective evaluation of scholarship in the context of
relevant-other-texts often raises special institutional and practical
problems that curtail the possibility of effective and fair evaluations.
We shall return to this issue, but first we consider the more specific
purposes and methods of contemporary legal scholarship.
I have employed the analogy of a philosopher to help us take a fresh
look at the multiple and complex values of modern legal scholarship.
This analogy promised to shift our focus, at least for a time, away
from the fairly common assumption that legal scholarship should have
some practical usefulness. This analogy also promised to help dislodge
our rather common habit of evaluating scholarship simply as a matter
of "originality," "quality," and "importance," without specifying
either the ultimate values that are served by originality, quality, or
importance or the exact nature of these standards. In the next sections, I turn to legal scholarship proper to analyze the specific purposes and methods of this scholarship, and then to analyze the shifting
perspectives and standards of both individuals and institutions that are
or should be involved in the writing and evaluation of contemporary
legal scholarship.
THE DIVERSITY OF PURPOSES
Legal scholars may work with the foregoing values in mind, but
their research and writing will be guided by more specific goals, functions, or genres of legal writing that for convenience I refer to as "purposes" or "categories." There are, I think, six basic purposes of legal
scholarship. These purposes overlap and many works are written with
more than one purpose in mind. These categories, then, are necessarily rather abstract and general in nature. Nevertheless, the analytical
separation of legal scholarship into these purposes or categories should
be useful in the evaluation of individual scholarly works.32
Lawyers frequently talk about "legal analysis." This concept commonly refers to diverse sorts of intellectual activity, but I will employ a
limited conception of legal analysis to define the first category of legal
32. In other contexts, of course, other taxonomies of legal scholarship may be more useful.

See, e.g., M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 23, at 1-4; Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought. 90
YALE L. J. 970 (1981); Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113
(1981).
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scholarship. The purpose of legal analysis as scholarship is to reduce,
separate, and break down cases, statutes, and other legal materials into
separate elements.3 3 Student casenotes, comments, or reflections on an
individual case, survey articles, treatises, and articles that analyze or
describe a series of cases, with little or no attempt at integration, and
newsletters that report the holdings of recent decisions are typically
written for the primary purpose of legal analysis. Similarly, the study
and explanation of new statutes, complex statutory schemes, and new
administrative rulings are in this category when they emphasize a
careful and precise description of doctrinal details involved in these
developments.
At a minimum, the scholarship of legal analysis involves the lawyer's basic method of "case analysis" or "case briefing."'34 This scholarship often provides direct help to practitioners by interpreting a case
or statute in ways they can use in their work. 35 The scholarship of
minimal legal analysis can be original if it is the first publication to
comment on a new case or statute, to review a batch of cases, or to
report case holdings in a way that is uniquely useful to readers. This
scholarship can also represent good quality work if it is performed
with accepted methods and generates useful results. This work may
even be important if its scope is broad enough to induce many readers
to rely upon the reported results or to employ the analysis in some
more imaginative fashion.
The minimum form of legal analysis may seem unexciting to many
researchers, readers, or evaluators. In addition, the minimum form of
legal analysis is marginally related to the discovery of knowledge,
because it presumable can be replicated by anyone who applies the
same analytical methods to the same materials. This scholarship,
then, may be disfavored in academic circles where the discovery of
knowledge is assumed to be the university's mission. Yet, in terms of
intellectual method and practical usefulness, this minimum form of
analysis has a legitimate claim to the label of legal scholarship that
should be recognized not only by the legal profession, but also by university-based law schools. The concept of a university, after all,
implies a notion of universality, which can encompass and serve both
professional and academic values. We should, therefore, value the dissemination of new and useful knowledge as well as the discovery of
33. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 257.
34. See, eg., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 53-55 (1930) (describing the technique
of case briefing).
35. See, eg., Kansas CriminalProcedureReview (a journal devoted primarily to reporting the
holdings of leading and recent decisions in criminal procedure law).
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knowledge. 3 6 Nonetheless, because of the disfavored status of legal
analysis in many academic institutions, untenured faculty members, in
particular, should perhaps view this traditional, but minimum form as
suspect and controversial. A safer course to earn tenure is to write
something of a more fulsome character, and only later turn to serve
the legal profession by producing good and original if minimal legal
analysis.
The scholarship of legal analysis can move beyond the mere analysis
of cases and statutory provisions to offer nonobvious explanations,
interpretations, and criticisms of the elements of the case or statute
analyzed.37 This work involves more complicated methods, as for
example, when an author relates the decision in a case to general
trends in the relevant case law, 38 or interprets and criticizes the decision from a policy-oriented perspective such as economic efficiency. 39
This more complex analysis can serve the values of understanding and
theory as well as practical usefulness. The analysis of a significant case
may offer a new and insightful interpretation, which helps us appreciate and understand not only the case but its possible implications for
other, as yet undetermined, situations.' In this more complex form,
the scholarship of legal analysis certainly produces new knowledge
that satisfies the university's traditional standards of scholarship.
A second category of legal scholarship is that of legal synthesis.
The purpose of this scholarship is to fuse the disparate elements of
cases and statutes together into coherent or useful legal standards or
general rules. In other words, legal synthesis involves the development of a standard that is consistent with, explains, or justifies a group
of specific legal decisions.4 1 This scholarship, like legal analysis, typically provides direct practical benefits to readers by indicating "what
the law is" on some prescribed subject. At times, however, legal synthesis can be designed simply to illuminate an interesting group of
decisions, or to develop theoretical principles that would better explain
or justify a line of decisions.4 2 In these situations, the writer may not
try to provide a synthesis that is of direct practical value. In this work
36. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Travers, Does a Monopolist Have a Duty to Deal With Its Rivals? Some Thoughts
on the Aspen Skiing Case, 57 COLO. L. REv. 727 (1986).
38. See, e.g., id. at 730-40.
39. See, e.g., id. at 740-45.
40. See, e.g., Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
41. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 49-51 (describing the synthesis of cases).
42. See, e.g., Craig, FederalIncome Tax and the Supreme Court: The Case Against a National
Court of Tax Appeals, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 679, 685-711.
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the scholar may not need to consider all the relevant cases in a comprehensive manner, all the details of a relevant legislative history, or
all the practical policy arguments advocates might employ when arguing from and against precedents. a3 In other words, legal synthesis for
non-practical purposes may avoid the conventional language of legal
practice, and indeed this language may interfere with the specific purposes of the investigation.
Like analysis, legal synthesis can be performed at minimum and
more complex levels. The minimum form involves either the construction of an analogy between cases or the development of a specific
standard or rule that reconciles the holdings and facts of a line of
cases." More complex synthesis connects a line of cases to more general, but related legal traditions, or to relevant social contexts.4 5 Legal
synthesis, even the minimum form, is more likely to satisfy the traditional university standards of scholarship than legal analysis. Even
the minimum forms of synthesis, though not in principle more difficult
than case analysis, will involve more writing and more apparent originality through the writer's proposal of a new standard that integrates
complex materials.
The scholarship of legal synthesis can, nonetheless, be subject to
serious misunderstandings by modem readers. As indicated, legal
synthesis can serve not only direct practical values, but also the different values of understanding, connections, and theoretical significance.
Practical synthesis must take into account all relevant doctrinal materials, and presumably considers conflicting policy arguments as well.
On the other hand, doctrinal synthesis that serves other values can
have a less comprehensive character with respect to doctrinal materials and policy arguments. Its focus may be to illuminate a particular
aspect of doctrine rather than specifying "what the law is." Unfortunately, legal synthesis designed to serve nonpractical values can be
misinterpreted as flawed or incomplete scholarship by readers who
43. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the tax decisions of the Burger Court can be explained by a
principle of deference to the special competencies of legislatures, the Internal Revenue Service,
and the Tax Court, as part of an effort to understand whether the United States Supreme Court is
capable of handling tax appeals). For discussions of the practical arguments of precedent and
policy that advocates typically make, see K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 70-77; Boyl6, The
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1052-58 (1985); Llewellyn, The Modern
Approach to Counselling and Advocacy-Especially in Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L.
REV. 167, 178-85 (1946).
44. See, eg., S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 25-84
(1985); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 49-51, 67-68; Bodenheimer, A Neglected Theory of
Legal Reasoning, 21 J. LEGAL EDuc. 373, 373-75 (1969).
45. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 42.
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demand, usually implicitly, that scholarship serve practical values in a
direct manner. This sort of misinterpretation is another problem
caused by our implicit evaluation process.
A third purpose of legal scholarship may be described as the resolution of doctrinal issues. Legal synthesis, when it clarifies what the
rules are, may be thought of as one kind of doctrinal resolution. But
this category has other forms, covers many issues, and employs a variety of methods. Doctrinal resolution includes advising courts or clients on how legal doctrine should be applied to specific cases,
transactions, or other legal events,46 suggesting resolution of conflicts
between the decisions of different courts, 47 and criticizing judicial
opinions because of their inconsistency with general doctrine or their
failure to promote policy values. 48 Doctrinal resolution also includes
more theoretical work that resolves broad areas of doctrinal uncertainty, confusion, or controversy such as tht. commercial speech doctrine or gender discrimination law under federal statutes. This
category of scholarship traditionally has employed the several methods of legal analysis, legal synthesis, and practical policy arguments.
For a long time, this kind of study has been the staple product of law
review publications if not of all legal scholarship.4 9
This scholarship, by attempting to resolve some legal issue, will
always appear to have direct practical value. This scholarship also typically requires or seems to require rather extensive writing about cases
and policies. Thus, unlike minimal legal analysis or synthesis from a
nonpractical perspective, this scholarship is quite likely to survive the
implicit evaluation processes of the academy, at least if the writing
makes some attempt to combine doctrinal synthesis with policy
50
analysis.
Nonetheless, there is a sense of unease and discord in law schools
today about the nature and value of doctrinal resolution as a major
46. See, e.g., Knebel, Antitrust Counseling: The Five Factors of Antitrust Liability, 9 J. CORP.
L. 359 (1984); The Tax Clinic Column, in The Tax Advisor, (a series of columns offering specific
practical advice to tax practitioners).
47. See, e.g., Note, Walking a Tightrope Without a Net: Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans
after Weber, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1986).
48. See Nowak, supra note 1, at 324-28; Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 731, 731 (1987) ("Since they first began publication, American law reviews have seen the
criticism ofjudicial opinions as a major part of their mission. A typical law review note, or even
a leading article, will address an important judicial decision, or series of decisions, in an effort to
show that the court has misconceived the problem, the solution, or both.").
49. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 1, at 321-22; Posner, supra note 32, at 1113-16.
50. See Posner, supra note 32, at 1113-16 (describing the combination of doctrinal analysis
and practical policy arguments that pervades traditional doctrinal scholarship).
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purpose of legal scholarship." This scholarship employs a rather
unsystematic combination of analysis, doctrinal synthesis, policy argument, and common sense judgment to support scholarly recommendations to lawyers and courts about how practical legal issues should be
resolved. 2 Traditionally, when law professors thought of themselves
as elite members of the legal profession, perhaps even as its "ideal
judges," 53 academic writers did not worry or need to worry about the
imprecise methods used to support their practical judgments. This
was true even though they usually made these judgments one step
removed from the context of practical problems. 4 Today, however,
law professors are losing their elite status within an increasingly commercialized and highly paid profession. At the same time, law professors have become more fully incorporated into the worlds of
universities and university bureaucracies.5 Legal realism and the current post-realist movements in the legal academy also have introduced
all law professors, especially our more prolific readers and writers, to
the more systematic theories and methods of academic disciplines such
as economics, political science, philosophy, and even literary theory.5 6
These trends may explain the current unease and discord about doctrinal scholarship in the legal academy, and they may also provide a
basis for the criticism of much or all practical doctrinal scholarship. 7
The infusion of theories and methods from other disciplines into
contemporary legal scholarship presents an opportunity for the development of a richer and more contextual doctrinal scholarship.58 This
scholarship, one hopes, may ultimately integrate the relevant learnings
51. See, eg., id. at 1113-19, 1129; Schlegel, Searchingfor Archimedes-Legal Education,
Legal Scholarship, and Liberal Ideology, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103 (1984); Stevens, American
Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
442 (1983).
52. See, eg., Llewellyn, supra note 43.
53. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 259.
54. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 23, at 1-2.
55. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 271-76, 288-89.
56. See, eg., Posner, supra note 14, at 766-77.
57. Compare Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 432
(1983) (trashing traditional forms of legal scholarship) with Posner, supra note 32, at 1113
(arguing that doctrinal scholarship of the traditional kind is and should remain "the core of legal
scholarship").
58. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977)
(developing Kantian and utilitarian theories of the takings doctrine in constitutional law); R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (presenting an

economic interpretation of antitrust doctrine); Sunstein, InterestGroups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (employing a Madisonian theory of democratic representation to
interpret the rationality doctrine in constitutional law and the hard look doctrine in
administrative procedure law); see Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131,
1131 (1981) ("What is going on is a shift from one kind of doctrinal analysis to another kind of
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of other disciplines and of theoretical legal scholarship into the analysis, synthesis, and resolution of doctrinal issues, even if doctrinal
scholarship remains fundamentally a matter of pluralistic views and
practical judgment.5 9 Conclusions about these questions, however,
must take into account the categories, subcategories, and methods of
our nondoctrinal or theoretical legal scholarship. Our ultimate judgments about these matters will also benefit from the development of a
more explicit process for evaluating individual works of scholarship.
A fourth purpose of legal scholarship is the production of teaching
materials. Consistent with a practice-based definition of scholarship, I
include in this category not only casebooks and hornbooks, but all
kinds of educational guides such as continuing education materials,
bar review materials, and even case outlines produced for law students. These latter types of writing are writings about the law, and as
a matter of practice and convention may be said to appear in recognized "legal publications." Furthermore, these kinds of writing
explain legal doctrine and may involve the same qualities of analysis,
synthesis, and doctrinal resolution as those in casebooks or hornbooks.
Of course, the methods and quality, originality, and importance of
these less formal educational guides may typically be of lesser note or
more difficult to detect than those of the casebook or hornbook, but
this presents a question of evaluation rather than definition of legal
scholarship.
The final two purposes of legal scholarship might be called "understanding" and "critique." In these categories, the understanding and
critique of legal doctrine or the legal process is based on some perspective, such as sociology, history, economics, or philosophy, that is
outside the framework of legal doctrine.6 ° These purposes have
always been present in our literature, but have become more prominent with the new pluralism in legal scholarship and are today replete
with new subcategories and diverse methods within each subcategory.
doctrinal analysis. Speaking very broadly, the newer sorts of analysis are characterized by a
more self-conscious and elaborate conceptual apparatus than the kinds they are displacing.").
59. On the application to legal reasoning of Aristotelian ideas of dialectical reasoning, the
coherent integration of general principles and particulars, and practical judgment that entails
both sympathy for and detachment from competing arguments and interpretations, see H.G.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 289-305 (1975 Eng. trans.); Bodenheimer, supra note 44;
Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U.CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987); Lehman, Rules in Law, 72 GEO. L.
J. 1571 (1984); Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489.
60. Cf M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 23, at 1-4 (dividing legal scholarship into three
categories: doctrinal scholarship, studies for the purpose of understanding the law, and legal
theory, which attempts to illuminate and criticize the underlying principles of legal doctrine);
Posner, supra note 32, at 1113-29 (dividing legal scholarship into three categories: doctrinal
scholarship, "positive analysis with social science methods," and a "new normativism").
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In this essay, I can provide only a brief sketch of these categories, but
this picture will help indicate our need for a more flexible and more
explicit evaluation process.
The understanding of legal doctrine and legal practices involves the
explanation of causes, the analysis of consequences, and the interpretation of meaning, or some combination of these functions. The scholarship of understanding includes the new legal history that emphasizes
the specification of relationships between legal doctrine and its social
contexts,6 1 the economic analysis of law in its positive as opposed to
normative forms, 62 the law and society scholarship that specifies the
social nature and consequences of legal doctrine and practices, 63 and
the critical legal studies literature that attempts to illuminate the
explicit and implicit symbols and ideology of legal doctrine.' 4
Another important if traditional subcategory of this scholarship
may be called "clinical scholarship." By this I mean writing that analyzes, reflects upon, and interprets legal practices as opposed to legal
doctrine. This sort of writing has been present for a long time in publications such as state bar journals and essays of law professors about
their craft.6 5 In recent years, however, this scholarship has expanded
greatly. The significant increase in the number of law professors, 66 the
growth of clinical legal education, and, since 1948, the availability and
free distribution to all law professors of the Journal of Legal Education 67 are probably all important causes of this development.
The purpose of understanding law, of course, serves the value of
understanding. It also may serve the values of play, practical useful61. See Nelson, supra note 5.
62. See, e.g., J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST POLICY (1954). See generally Hansmann, The Current State ofLaw-and-Economic

Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 217 (1983); Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L.
REV. 757 (1975).
63. See, eg., Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). See generally Friedman,
The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); Macaulay, Law and the
Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y Q. 149 (1984).

64. See, eg., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277
(1984).
65. See, eg., Baldwin, The Study of Elementary Law, the Proper Beginning of a Legal
Education, 13 YALE L.J. 1 (1903); Baldwin, Teaching Law by Cases, 14 HARV. L. REV. 258
(1900); Dicey, The Teaching of English Law at Harvard, 13 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1899).
66. See, e.g., Auerbach, Legal Education and Its Discontents, 34 J, LEGAL EDUC. 43, 44
(1984) (since 1960, law school enrollment at ABA-approved schools has increased about 215%,
and overall law school enrollment has increased about 200%).
67. See Currie, Concerning the Journal 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309 (1948).
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ness, theoretical significance, and connections to other projects, especially teaching, because this scholarship develops and demonstrates
reasons for retaining or abandoning legal doctrines and practices.6 8
Accordingly, this category of scholarship requires especially sensitive
evaluations by researchers, readers, academic committees, and publishers. Evaluators will have to assess the values that are actually
served and to assess whether particular works employ appropriate
methods from other disciplines that further our understanding of law
69
and the legal process.
The sensitive evaluation of the scholarship of understanding will not
be an easy task, at least for many of us. To evaluate this scholarship,
we shall need to become more familiar and comfortable with new and
often competing perspectives, styles, and methods within nonlegal disciplines. The costs of this endeavor will include substantial time, frustration, and learning to be cautious rather than bold in our
evaluations, use, and performance of scholarship grounded in other
disciplines. We shall need, that is, to put aside certain lawyerly images
of ourselves as quick learners and masters of our domain if we are to
make effective sense and use of other disciplines in their connection to
the law. Without such careful and sensitive appraisal, the evaluation of
the new scholarship of understanding is likely to result merely in personal opinion and fiat with little redeeming social value.7"
The sixth purpose of legal scholarship concerns the critique of legal
doctrine and practice. From a perspective outside the framework of
legal doctrine, the scholar in this field strives to understand some legal
subject and then argue for a better way of doing things.7' The legal
realists instituted this approach to legal scholarship.72 Its contempo68. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51-58, 65-73
(1921)(describing the "method of history" in judicial decisionmaking, which attempts to
understand and apply legal rules in the light of their historical origins, and the "method of
sociology," which attempts to extend or restrict legal rules in the light of public policy and the
standards of right conduct); see also J.H. PLUMB, THE DEATH OF THE PAST 106 (1970) ("The
historian's purpose, therefore, is to deepen understanding about men and society, not merely for
its own sake, but in the hope that a more profound knowledge, a more profound awareness will
help to mould human attitudes and human actions. Knowledge and understanding should not
end in negation, but in action.").
69. Cf Nelson, supra note 5, at 477-491 (calling for new and explicit standards of criticism
for modern legal history scholarship in view of the different types of legal history and conflicting
tastes and ideologies of reviewers).
70. See, e.g., Posner, Law and Literature:A Relation Reargued. 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986).

71. Cf M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 23, at 2-4 (describing the scholarship of legal theory as
involving some contextual understanding and criticism of existing legal doctrine).
72. See, e.g.. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: The Singular
Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1980); Schlegel. American Legal Realism
and EmpiricalSocial Science: From the Yale Experience. 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459 (1979).
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rary forms include the extensive normative work in economic analysis
of law,7 3 the analysis of doctrine and practices from varying perspectives in moral philosophy,' 4 and the attempts of both critical legal
studies and feminist scholars to argue that the legal system should be
changed fundamentally to promote egalitarian and more contextual
perspectives about social justice.7 5 Like the purpose of understanding,
this purpose of critique can serve any or all of the ultimate values of
legal scholarship. The modem scholarship of critique also requires
sensitive and flexible evaluations by researchers and readers that assess
whether appropriate methods are being used and whether ultimate
values are or can be achieved by the work in question.
In sum, there are six somewhat complex and overlapping purposes
of legal scholarship. Four of these are traditional among law professors, lawyers, and law students, but these types of scholarship are
developing a new complexity in terms of the values they serve, their
subcategories, and methods. Two purposes, understanding and critique, have obtained a new prominence as they have been developed by
the various schools and movements of modem legal scholarship. If all
this scholarship is to be read, interpreted, pursued, and evaluated with
a maximum degree of fairness and effectiveness, the readers and evaluators of contemporary legal scholarship must become more flexible
and more explicit in their evaluation processes.
DIVERSE METHODS
When one considers the specific methods that scholars employ to
achieve their purposes, the new pluralism in legal scholarship becomes
even more obvious and perhaps more confusing. In each category of
scholarship there is considerable evidence of new tensions and complexities in and between the different methods employed by contemporary scholars. While some tension and complexity in methods have
always been present," the pluralistic situation today seems confusing
and disturbing to a profession that has placed great weight on the concept of authority and on conventional methods of inquiry. My reason
for noting the current welter of scholarly methods is not to damn
73. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
74. See, e.g., Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability,and
Equality in the Eraof the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975 (1978); Luban, Epistemnology
and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636 (1983).
75. See, e.g., Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.-REv. 955 (1984);
Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
76. See, eg., K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 55-57, 67-76 (describing the uncertainty and
tension in the conventional analysis and use of legal precedents).
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them, however, but to praise them and to argue for a more careful
evaluation of contemporary legal scholarship.
Legal analysis and synthesis have always contained a certain tension
and conflict between two basic methods of interpretation. One method
places primary reliance on the express doctrinal statements of legislatures and courts. The other method relies more heavily on the "relevant facts" of cases, the concept of statutory purposes, and
conventional rules of inquiry that purport to determine standards that
explain or justify legislative and judicial decisions. 7 Today, however,
two factors heighten this tension and complexity. First, most scholars
now realize that there is usually a range of possible standards available
to courts for interpreting and applying statutes and precedents to new
situations.78 The conventional methods of the common law tended to
limit the interpretation of doctrinal materials to the narrowest possible
standard that explained or justified a single decision (legal analysis) or
line of decisions (legal synthesis).7 9 But the jurisprudential revolution
of the Warren Court,"° the modern academic's search of social contexts for attractive legal standards, 8' and our increasing interest in
arguing from precedent not only to establish certainty and fair notice,
which invites narrow interpretation, but also to serve the egalitarian
value of treating like cases alike, which invites to use of broad analogies and principles,8 2 now force writers of doctrinal scholarship to
consider a wide range of potential standards in the analysis and synthesis of legal doctrine.
A second factor that heightens tension and complexity is the wholesale importing of "nonlegal" methods into legal analysis and synthesis.
This phenomenon results from the contemporary interest in integrating legal doctrine and social context. Thus, to read and write the
77. See id.; Kornhauser & Sager, Unpackingthe Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 103-04 n. 29 (1986).
78. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45, 81-130 (1977) (describing

the general standards of legal principles and policies that supplement more specific legal rules in
legal interpretation, argument, and the justification of judicial decisions).
79. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 49-51.
80. See generally A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A.
Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
WARREN COURT (1970); Mason, Understanding the Warren Court: Judicial Self-Restraint and
Judicial Duty, 81' POL. ScI. Q. 523 (1966). For some recent attempts to justify and in part
confine the Warren Court revolution in constitutional law, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); R. DWORKIN, supra note 78; J.H. EL-1.
DEMOCRACY

AND

DISTRUST (1980);

M.

PERRY,

THE CONSTITUTION,

THE COURTS

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). For critiques of this revolution, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.
REV. 1 (1971).

81. See Ackerman, supra note 58; Posner, supra note 14.
82. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 81-130.
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modem scholarship of analysis and synthesis in an effective fashion,
both writers and readers of these basic categories of legal scholarship
often need to be equipped or ready to deal with economics, 83 other
social sciences,84 literary or Biblical interpretation, 85 and historical
interpretation. 86 Of course, importing foreign methods into the traditional categories of legal analysis and synthesis can be dismissed as
mere "academic stuff," but this dismissal is inconsistent with our professional traditions of flexibility, and comprehensiveness, and our willingness to learn anything that will be necessary or helpful.
As a result of these social and methodological changes, the scholarship of legal analysis and synthesis now ranges from the basic reporting of judicial decisions to more complex and less precise forms of
legal interpretation. In effect, these changes move analysis and synthesis away from their routine, conventional, and easily replicated methods of inquiry towards pluralistic modes of inquiry and interpretation.
In this view, these forms of scholarship may no longer deserve the
scientific rubrics of "analysis" and "synthesis." The new kinds of
analysis and synthesis, when considered together with the more exotic
forms of scholarship of understanding and critique, may indeed reflect
a fundamental turn away from the notion or concept of a "legal science." The new concept to which modern scholarship may be turning
is the more attractive and more powerful idea of "law as interpretation," or in other words, a conception of the law that constructs the
best interpretations of legal materials within the variegated and changing contexts of new conditions, new situations, and new social
values.87
The scholarship of doctrinal resolution is also exhibiting pluralistic
methods. Traditionally, legal 'scholars resolved controverted or open
doctrinal issues by employing two basic methods: the synthesis of
precedents and a sort of seat-of-the-pants policy analysis of the issue in
83. See, eg., Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact
of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L. J. 1511 (1984) (describing three antitrust-economic models).
84. See, e.g., Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 461
(describing social science approaches to contracting and contract law).
85. See Garet, Comparative NormativeHermeneutics:Scripture,Literature,Constitution, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 35 (1985); Law and Literature,60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982). For a good example
of such interpretation, see Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the Parables,93 YALE
L.J. 455 (1984).
86. See Nelson, History and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237,
1241-49 (1986) (describing different models of historical analysis that are relevant to
constitutional law).
87. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Ackerman, supra note 58; Dworkin, Law's
Ambitions for Itself 71 VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation. 60 TEX. L.
REV. 527 (1982).
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question.8 8 Today, the same factors that complicate legal analysis and
synthesis, as well as the more diverse and more systematic attempts to
analyze legal policy in the scholarship of understanding and critique,
have vastly increased the methods that scholars use to resolve doctrinal issues. For example, suppose one needs to interpret the fundamental purposes of a statute to help resolve contemporary doctrinal issues.
The investigator may turn to economic analysis, the broader sociological consequences of doctrine, an historical account of the statutes and
their interpretations, or to principles of moral and legal philosophy.89
This choice may depend upon the ultimate values that an investigator
hopes to serve by the doctrinal resolution. Without explicit consideration of the possible relationships among values, purposes, and methods, however, this scholarship is likely to suffer in terms of its writing,
its interpretation, its evaluation, and ultimately its value, because
neither the writer nor readers will understand why particular methods
were followed.
The scholarship of teaching materials probably has been least influenced by the new approaches and methods to legal inquiry. Traditionally, the authors of casebooks emphasized either the exposition of legal
doctrine or a presentation of cases and materials that challenged readers and analysts to develop their skills in critical reading, analysis, and
synthesis.9" This work and the exposition of doctrine in hornbooks
and less formal student guides involved the traditional methods of
legal analysis, synthesis, and (to a lesser extent) doctrinal resolution.
Most contemporary casebooks and other teaching materials follow
these basic patterns, although there is some evidence of change.
Today, a few casebooks and hornbooks attempt to integrate the study
of doctrine and social context by employing methods of economic
analysis, history, or moral philosophy.9 ' In addition, the law professor's definition of teaching materials may now include other kinds of
88. See Kelman, supra note 57, at 434-35; Posner, supra note 32, at 1114-16.
89. Cf Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1168-84 (1984)
(contrasting economic, political, and moral approaches to the fundamental values of antitrust
doctrine).
90. Compare E. BARRETT & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(7th ed. 1985) and W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(7th ed. 1982) (emphasizing the exposition of doctrine) with P. AREEDA. ANTITRUST ANAl YSIS
(3rd ed. 1981) and P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTION -L
DECISIONMAKING (2d ed. 1983) (emphasizing analytical methods and challenging readers to
engage in critical reading, analysis, and synthesis).
91. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 90; P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, supra note 90: H.
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAl_ ANTITRUST LAW (1985): R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST (2d ed. 1981); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAl L-w

(1978).
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texts from disciplines such as economics, political science, and history.92 These developments could portend a new complexity and
expansion in the nature of teaching materials that follows the developments apparent in other doctrinal scholarship.
Two points are worth observing about the obvious diversity of
methods in the modem scholarship of understanding and critique.
This scholarship, fortunately or unfortunately, borrows its methods
from other intellectual disciplines and thus inherits the contemporary
conflicts and diversity of methods in these disciplines. For example,
the economic analysis of antitrust doctrine may depend upon structural theories of the Harvard school, the neo-1classical price theory of
the Chicago school, or the more dynamic analysis of contemporary
economists who emphasize the detailed study of organizational behavior, transaction costs, and experience curves.9 3 Similarly, the historical
study of legal doctrine may emphasize either "descriptive history" or
one of several kinds of "contextual history."9 4 There are, I believe, no
simple or exclusive answers to the choice of appropriate methods in
either of these fields, or in other interdisciplinary scholarship such as
feminist jurisprudence or critical legal studies. The choice of methods
should fit the particular subject, values, and purposes that the investigator wants to pursue, but beyond this little may be said. Once again,
however, the need for flexible, explicit, and particularistic evaluations
of contemporary scholarship should be evident.95
A second point about the scholarship of understanding and critique
is perhaps more obvious, but still deserves emphasis. This scholarship
already influences the purposes and methods of more traditional legal
scholarship. Significantly, this influence is likely to expand rather
than contract as our current generation of somewhat restless law
professors looks around for new fields to conquer after tenure. This is
a time in one's career when new trends in legal scholarship may
appear particularly attractive, at least to those who are interested in
92. See Gellhorn & Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1983); Morgan, Teaching Students for the 21st Century, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
285, 289-90 (1986) (noting the promise of the social sciences for legal education); Social Science
in Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 465 (1985). For an example of such a text, see R.
POSNER, supra note 73.
93. See Rowe, supra note 83.
94. See Nelson, supra note 86, at 1241-49.
95. Cf.Geertz, Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19 (1983) (social behavior can often be
understood only by reference to multiple perspectives, and social scientists today are constantly
borrowing concepts and methods from other intellectual disciplines on an as-needed basis,
notwithstanding their lack of formal training in these other disciplines).
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trying to do seminal or outstanding scholarship.9 6 In view of these
influences, all evaluators of legal writing, from casual or occasional
readers of practice-oriented scholarship, to writers of practical scholarship, why even to law deans and academic recruitment committees,
should take the new kinds of theoretical scholarship seriously and
evaluate their influence at its source. This will not be easy in view of
the plurality of styles and methods in the new scholarship, but this is
likely to be the only effective and fair way to understand and critique
the current legal scholarship of understanding and critique. 97
SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES IN EVALUATION
A final important factor in the evaluation of scholarship concerns
the different and often shifting perspectives that writers and readers
bring to writing, reading, and evaluation. This factor is reflected in
the traditional concern among composition teachers about writing for
specific audiences, and in the concept of modern literary and legal theorists that readers inevitably write their own texts as they read.98 In
this section, I shall delineate these shifting perspectives and their
implications for researchers, readers, administrators, and editors of
contemporary law reviews. The basic points are that these different
and shifting perspectives are legitimate or understandable aspects of
legal scholarship, that they play an important if unrecognized role in
the writing and reading of much scholarship, and that an effective
evaluation process requires attention to these perspectives as well as to
the diverse values, purposes, and methods of legal scholarship.
Legal scholars typically pass through two or more distinct career
stages that influence their scholarship. Many start as members of law
review staffs. In general, this scholarship is informed by law school
training and employs the traditional or minimum forms and methods
of analysis, synthesis, and doctrinal resolution. Subsequently, some
legal scholars write while practicing law full-time. This scholarship
96. On the apparent restlessness of the current generation of American law professors, see
Auerbach, supra note 66, at 67-72; Kissam, supra note 3, at 269-71.
97. For recent discussions of the new critical legal studies scholarship by interested and
sympathetic, but still critical outsiders, see, e.g., Brosnan, supra note 14; Delgado, The Ethereal
Scholar:Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities Want? 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
301 (1987); Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights. Legal
Entitlements. and the Social Struggle:A Friendly Critique of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement.
36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
98. See, e.g., Barthes, Writing Reading, in THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 29 (R. Howard trans.
1986); S. FISH, Is TH-RE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); Levinson, Law as Literature. 60 TEX.

L. REV. 373 (1982).
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concentrates on the four traditional purposes of doctrinal scholarship,
including preparation of teaching materials of the expository kind.
This scholarship, like most student writing, is likely to employ the
traditional methods of legal analysis, synthesis, and policy analysis,
but the scholarship of practitioners is more likely to emphasize the
rich factual contexts of practice and the synthesis of complex legal
authorities as a major component or purpose of the writing.9 9 Of
course, the scholarship of practitioners raises the possibility of special
pleading by writers who are advocates for clients' positions. 'I Nonetheless, even special pleading, if done with originality and quality,
deserves a place in our rather open universe of legal publications.
Many scholars also write within the two distinct stages of academic
careers: pre-tenure and post-tenure. A writer's law review experience
and usually brief practice experience, often as a judicial clerk and frequently as an associate in a corporate law firm, heavily influences most
pre-tenure writing.10 1 This writing tends to be quite specialized, in
part as a matter of prior training and experience and in part as a matter of writing with some originality to obtain a favorable tenure decision.1 "2 Understandably, most pre-tenure writing employs the
traditional purposes and methods of doctrinal scholarship. While this
may limit the originality and importance of this work, the use of traditional purposes and methods is most likely to satisfy conventional and
implicit notions about the quality, importance, and practical values of
legal scholarship. Most pre-tenure writers, then, may be well served
by following these conventional practices in order to construct the
beginnings of their careers.
More complex choices and dilemmas face the scholar after a
favorable tenure decision. In the post-tenure setting, scholars can in
principle obtain time and other resources to pursue new subjects, new
methods, and the more innovative purposes of legal scholarship. Of
course, this approach to post-tenure scholarship may result in substantial deviation from the standard purposes, methods, and patterns of
scholarship by law review members, practitioners, and pre-tenure
scholars, and the risks of this approach may deter many putative
99. See, eg., Brunet & Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After
Northwest Wholesale Stationers:Evolving AntitrustApproaches to Pleadings,Burden of Proof and
Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1986).
100. See Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1147-48.
101. On the backgrounds of American law professors at the time they enter teaching, see
Fossum, Law Professors:A Profile ofthe TeachingBranch of the Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 501.
102. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 275-76.
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scholars. In any event, four distinct patterns of scholarship can be
observed in the work of contemporary post-tenure scholars.
The work of "traditional scholars" continues to develop the perspective of law review and pre-tenure writing by employing the traditional methods of legal inquiry to carry out doctrinal analysis,
synthesis, and resolution. A second pattern represents the work of
"teaching scholars," whose publications tend to be closely related to
or even part of their teaching of doctrine and skills to law students and
practitioners. A third pattern is the work of a group we might call
"practitioner scholars." The publications of these university-based
scholars are often informed by research carried out under consulting
contracts and they are designed to serve the immediate practical needs
of the legal profession. The scholarship of this group, unlike that of
the previous groups, often focuses on matters outside appellate courts
and tends to feature rich understandings of practical professional contexts. The fourth pattern lies in the work of a group we might call
"contextual scholars." These researchers emphasize the newer modes
of doctrinal analysis, synthesis, and resolution as well as the purposes
and methods of understanding and critique.
In my pluralistic view, each of these patterns of legal scholarship is
understandable and legitimate. The more important point, however, is
this: in each of these patterns, if the work is to be of high quality,
significant originality, and substantial importance or influence, the
scholar, in most cases, will need to break away from the more conventional approaches and methods exhibited by the earlier stages or perspectives of legal scholarship. 10 3 The influential teaching scholar will
need to discover new and effective ways to explain doctrine or challenge students to learn by their own critical reading and thinking. The
influential practitioner scholar will need to enrich the analysis of practical subjects with the factual contexts and innovative methods of synthesis and policy argument that are crucial to the effective practice of
law.' °4 The influential contextual scholar must master the methods
and knowledge of other disciplines, perhaps several disciplines.'0 5
Finally, even the traditional scholar will need to extend the use of conventional methods from the typically narrow and specialized subjects
of earlier work to the broader canvasses of books or treatises that consider legal doctrine from a doctrinal point of view.' 6
103. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
104. See supra text accompanying note 99.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96.
106. My reasons for doubting the possibilities for much important or influential doctrinal

scholarship of the traditional kind lie with two basic developments: The completion of the
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This breakaway, for most of us, will require time and the capability
to master new systems of knowledge. These may include knowledge of
more effective teaching and communication techniques, the tacit
knowledge of outstanding practitioners, or simply the knowledge and
methods of other academic disciplines. Attempts at break away will
also involve substantial risks, because the time devoted to acquire
these new kinds of knowledge may never result in the expected payoffs. Importantly, this break away process may be constrained by the
formalist paradigm of traditional classroom work and scholarship.
The young post-tenure scholar's work under this paradigm will have
earned the scholar high law school grades, a measure of economic
security, and at least some professional status. This paradigm, which
worked so well, may thus limit the scholar's vision about the richer
possibilities that might accrue from pursuit of more innovative patterns in contemporary legal scholarship.1" 7 Perhaps this breakaway,
then, can only be obtained by doing something out of the ordinary,
such as practicing law full time or studying another discipline. If this
is so, the best practical moment for this extraordinary something to
take place may be immediately after a favorable tenure decision. At
this time, the effect of the formalist paradigm on the young post-tenure
scholar may be relatively weak for two reasons. The paradigm will
not yet have been practiced and perfected over a long period of time,
and the new post-tenure scholar may possibly be in a reflective state of
mind about the directions of his or her future scholarship.° 8
Distinct patterns are also evident in the reading of legal scholarship.
These too should be kept in mind as we engage in writing and evaluatfundamental treatise work on legal doctrine in the first third of the twentieth century, see
Auerbach, supra note 66, at 66-67; Schlegel, supranote 51, at 107, and the essentially contextual
nature of the most important legal developments in contemporary American jurisprudence. See
B. ACKERMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LAw (1984) (arguing that modem
lawyers, including scholars, need to master economics and moral philosophy); Posner, supranote
14 (arguing that other academic disciplines are necessary for significant legal scholarship).
107. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 290-93 (describing the formalist paradigm of contemporary
classroom work and doctrinal scholarship as a limiting factor on law school methods); Posner,
supra note 32, at 1113-16, 1121-23 (suggesting that the paradigm of traditionaJ doctrinal
scholarship explains the resistance of many doctrinal scholars to new forms of nondoctrinal
scholarship); Schlegel, Langdell'sLegacy Or, The Case ofthe Empty Envelope (Book Review), 36
STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1532-33 (1984) (suggesting that contemporary law school formalism may
be a product of the historical search by law professors for a professional identity and, more
fundamentally, of the deep cultural attachment of most Americans to a rule-oriented notion of
law). On the nature of scientific paradigms, or major scientific achievements, which are accepted
as the models of inquiry in scientific research communities for periods of time, and which
promote both efficiency in research and a certain blind resistance to new research ideas, see T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).

108. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 311-12.
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ing legal scholarship. One pattern is the common practice of instrumental reading in which we read to acquire knowledge directly
without further reflection or thought.' 0 9 A second pattern might be
called reflective reading. In this process, one reads scholarly texts to
obtain background information and ideas that may stimulate or
inspire some project by causing the reader to reflect on implications of
the text and to draw connections, of analogy, of attitude, or of method,
between the text and the reader's own projects." 0 This sort of reading
may be the most likely to attract casual or occasional readers to the
new kinds of legal scholarship that involve doctrinal resolution, understanding, and critique. A third pattern of reading may be called critical reading."' In this process, one applies some sort of external
standard to evaluate a text. These critical standards will vary from
context to context and can range from simply victory for one side in a
legal dispute, to the vindication of a reader's own theories or position
on some legal matter, to the standards of good, important, and outstanding scholarship applied in formal academic evaluations, to the
complex triage process and committee judgments implicated in law
review decisions to accept or reject articles for publication."'
These different patterns of reading are relevant to the evaluation of
legal scholarship in several ways. First, both the writers and evaluators of legal scholarship should be clear about the type of reading or
audience for which a work of scholarship is written. Scholarship written primarily for instrumental reading should emphasize extreme clarity of organization and style. Scholarship written for a reflective
audience, however, may benefit from more elegant and specialized
styles. These styles attempt to realize the values of economy, insight,
and suggestiveness by employing the concepts and vocabulary of a
legal specialty, for example, tax or bankruptcy law, or relevant disci109. See Grinols, supra note 20 (contrasting instrumental with critical reading).
110. See R. BARTHES, supra note 98, at 29 ("Has it never happened, as you were reading a
book, that you kept stopping as you read, not because you weren't interested, but because you
were: because of a flow of ideas, stimuli, associations? In a word, haven't you ever happened to
read while looking upfrom your book?") (author's emphasis); see also C. DUFFY, THE MILITARY
LIFE OF FREDERICK THE GREAT 300 (1986) (reporting the view of Frederick the Great that the

principles of warfare were to be acquired in part "from a continuous evaluation of one's own
experiences, and the officer who failed to make this effort would end his days like the pack mule
who followed Prince Eugene on his campaigns, and remained just as ignorant as when he set
out"); cf D. ScHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1983) (arguing that the best professional

practitioners develop their practice in good part by continually reflecting on the uncertainties,
complexity, and value conflicts that confront them in their practice situations).
I 11. See Grinols, supra note 20.
112. On the committee decisionmaking process of contemporary law reviews, see Cramton,
supra note 1, at 8-9.
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plines like finance economics or critical social theory. This scholarship may be less accessible to the general reader, but its specialized
style may be necessary or helpful to achieve the values of connectedness, understanding, and influence with a particular audience of scholars or practitioners. Finally, scholarship written primarily for a
critical audience should presumably engage all the competing arguments and evidence that a particular critical audience will deem relevant. Some scholarship, however, may try to reach many audiences,
and this frequently can produce adverse consequences. For example,
the typical ornate, lengthy, and heavily-footnoted law review article
may be the consequence of too many writers and editors trying to
serve too many audiences by means of a single instrument. This heavily-criticized but common style of writing appears to be another unfortunate effect of our traditional implicit evaluation process.
Second, readers who are not involved in the formal evaluation of
legal scholarship should also keep the three patterns of reading in
mind. This perspective might allow many readers to serve their own
purposes more efficiently, as they consciously shift back and forth
between instrumental, reflective, and critical readings. Furthermore,
in the informal evaluation of others' writing, readers who can shift
consciously between reflective and critical reading may provide especially helpful assistance to both legal writers and potential writers.
The writing process involves two rather distinct stages, one of "creation" and one of "critical revision." Readers can often provide writers
with invaluable feedback if they offer "creative feedback" and "critical
feedback" at the appropriate stages of writing."1 3 Reflective reading
appears to be closely related to the creative thinking and writing process. Critical reading clearly is necessary to the process of critical revision. Thus, these different modes of reading, if employed at
appropriate times, may promote good writing by generating more useful commentary and feedback on drafts of scholarly papers, and on
other sorts of legal writing as well." 4
Third, those engaged in critical reading will be more effective evaluators if they specify the external standards used in their critical reading. I do not claim that this will be an easy task, but it is a necessary
one if our evaluation process is to respect the pluralism in contemporary legal scholarship. Critical readers will bring prejudgments or
113. See P. ELBOW, supra note 19, at 6-175; Elbow, Teaching Thinking by Teaching Writing
CHANGE, Sept. 1983, at 37.
114. See P. ELBOW, supra note 19, at 240-54; cf Kissam, supra note 20, at 168-73
(discussing a two-stage writing process, with different kinds of reading and feedback at the two
stages of this process, in law schools, law firms, and legal scholarship).
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prejudices to their understanding and evaluating of any text, and this
is not only inevitable, but desirable in a pluralistic world." 5 Nonetheless, to be most effective, critical readers must respect the values, purposes, methods, and perspectives in scholarly work that are different
from their own. Critical readers should strive to integrate or reconcile
these different approaches or perspectives with their own. Without
this kind of flexible and sensitive attention to the differences between
one's prejudices and the values of others, the critical reading of contemporary legal scholarship surely becomes something of an ineffec16
tual if not mindless muddle.'
The analysis in this essay also supports some specific recommendations for law school administrators and law review editors about the
nature of their evaluation processes. First, administrators, administrative committees concerned with scholarship, external evaluators, and
law review editors should be flexible in their evaluations and take
explicit account of the different values, purposes, methods, and perspectives involved in both contemporary scholarship and their evaluation processes. Second, law school administrators who wish to
promote influential or other valuable scholarship by their faculty
should encourage post-tenure "breakaways" from the formalist paradigm of traditional legal inquiry. 17 The possible means for doing this
include post-tenure leaves for the full-time practice of law or academic
study, post-tenure "scholarship moratoriums," and post-tenure relief
from teaching responsibilities. These different arrangements could
give potential teaching scholars, practitioner scholars, and contextual
scholars the time and other resources to follow individual practice
plans or courses of study in appropriate nonlegal disciplines and subjects that would enrich their future scholarship. Law school administrators also might develop incentives to encourage joint teaching
between younger and more experienced faculty members that could
produce not only more interesting teaching, but also a richer
scholarship. '
Third, the growing divergence between the perspectives, purposes,
and methods of many contemporary scholars and the perspectives and
training of most law review editors appears to lie at the heart of the
115.

See H.G. GADAMER, supra note 59, at 235-74.

116. Cf Nelson, supra note 5, at 490-91 (describing his view of an appropriate but limited
role for a reviewer's aesthetic and ideological preferences in the evaluation of legal history
scholarship).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
118. Cf Kissam, supra note 3, at 310-12 (describing these and other possible methods for
encouraging a more contextual approach to law teaching and legal scholarship).
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current criticisms of student-edited law reviews. 11 9 These criticisms
commonly propose to replace or reorganize these reviews, or to supplement them, with new faculty-edited law reviews. Nevertheless, the
pluralism in contemporary legal scholarship and the implications of
this pluralism for the evaluation of scholarship suggest an important
argument for retaining student-edited law reviews. In a pluralistic
world, where each academic professional is often captured by his or
her single paradigm of inquiry, be this the formalist paradigm, economic analysis, or critical legal studies, the retention of student editors
as the ultimate arbiters of legal publication could have a significant
advantage.1 20 Especially as law school training changes,1 21 student
editors may be less captive of any single paradigm of inquiry than
more experienced scholars. Furthermore, student editors can cope
with the new pluralism in scholarship by expanding their informal networks for advisory peer review of submitted articles by faculty members at the review's own school and university. Although these
informal networks may offend our desires for procedural openness,
objectivity in evaluation, and the values of meritocracy, these networks have always existed,' 2 2 and their expansion, which could
include the use of faculty from the rest of the university, should provide useful and informed advice to the ultimate arbiters of law journal
publication.
Another complaint about modern law reviews concerns their growing bureaucracy and government by committee, with the delays and
common denominator decision making that this implies. 123 One pluralistic answer to this problem would be to rotate the responsibility for
different issues among editors, thus insuring an increased measure of
student pluralism in the selection of articles. The use of practitioners
and faculty members who serve as guest editors for specific issues
could also promote scholarly pluralism in the publication policies of
individual law reviews.' 2 4 A third approach might develop advisory
119. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 14. For an early version of this
criticism of law reviews, see Nussbaum, Some Remarks About the Position of Student-Editors of
the Law Review, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 381 (1955).
120. Cf Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11
(1986) (arguing that student edited law reviews may be necessary to promote scholarship for
professional audiences).
121. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 3; Morgan, supra note 92; The Place ofEconomics in Legal
Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983).
122. See Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
14 (1986).
123. See Cramton, supra note 1, at 8-9.
124. Cf Henry, Introduction, in THE PLOUGHSHARES READER: NEw FICTION FOR THE
EIGH'riES 11-12 (1985) (explaining that each issue of Ploughshares has been edited by a different
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boards of practitioners or selected faculty members to help the student
editors at law reviews solicit and screen articles that would serve both
pluralism and the diverse interests of a review's readers and audiences.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: EXPLAINING THE LAG
Contemporary legal scholarship has become pluralistic in its values,
purposes, methods, and perspectives. The evaluation of this scholarship should become equally pluralistic, whether done by individuals
contemplating a scholarly project, the readers of legal scholarship, or
evaluators committed to some formal institutional task. In view of the
nature of contemporary scholarship, only a very flexible and self-conscious evaluation would take explicit account of the different values,
purposes, methods, and perspectives involved in a work of legal scholarship. This kind of evaluation would also apply the standards of originality, quality, importance, and outstanding scholarship in a more
explicit fashion.
The promotion of a pluralistic evaluation process might be
advanced if we could understand why our evaluations have lagged
behind the emergence of the new pluralism in legal scholarship. I see
three basic reasons that might explain the continuing hold of implicit
assumptions about the values, purposes, and methods of legal scholarship despite the new pluralism.
The first reason is a set of psychological and social factors that influence those who adhere to traditional forms of doctrinal scholarship.
The work of these scholars, in both the classroom and doctrinal writings, concentrates on the careful, comprehensive, and precise analysis
of relatively abstract doctrinal standards found in the legal forms of
cases, statutes, administrative rulings, and legislative histories. This
work engenders strong emotional attachment to the formalist paradigm of legal inquiry and to an ideology of neutral and objective law
which requires a thorough analysis of legal forms. The formalist paradigm and ideology of objectivity, then, may cause many traditional
scholars to dismiss without examination the more adventurous and
pluralistic kinds of scholarship in today's academic world.' 2 5 Signifieditor to provide a forum for contrasting viewpoints and styles). The use of special editors for
different issues of a law journal is a practice of Duke Law School's faculty-edited journal. Law
and Contemporary Problems.
125. See Jones, Some Current Trends in Legal Research. 15 J. LEGAL EDUc. 121, 133-38

(1962); Kissam supra note 3, at 290-93; Posner, supra note 32, at 1121-23; ef supra note 107 and
accompanying text (describing a formalist paradigm of law school methods that limits the ability
of law professors to break away from their customary habits and engage successfully In
nondoctrinal scholarship).
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cantly, this paradigm and this ideology, because of their emphasis on
semi-abstract doctrine as a necessary condition of scholarly quality,
can preclude the effective and fair consideration of rougher, more
practical kinds of problem solving and scholarship just as easily as
they can disadvantage the academic scholarship of understanding and
critique. Traditionalist readers and evaluators of legal scholarship
may thus be as dismissive of new kinds of teaching and practitioner
scholarship as they are of contextual scholarship, even though the new
teaching and practitioner scholarship may be especially well-designed
to serve traditional professional values.
A second reason for the lag of evaluation behind scholarship is a
psychological and social factor that influences the evaluation of scholarship by revolutionaries. Revolutionary efforts of particular kinds,
say the economic analysis of law, critical legal studies, or feminist
jurisprudence, may require a certain sustaining faith or arrogance that
is as dismissive of other kinds of scholarship as traditionals are dismissive of the new forms.1 26 Perhaps time, as well as a degree of success
for these revolutionary efforts, 127 will encourage both our revolutionaries and our traditional evaluators to appreciate the pluralistic avenues in contemporary legal scholarship.
A third reason for the lag in evaluation behind scholarship is a more
philosophical one, although this factor, too, may exist at both conscious and subconscious levels. Richard Bernstein recently described
a "Cartesian anxiety" about the nature of knowledge that plagues
Western intellectuals. 128 This anxiety concerns the perceived need of
intellectuals, since the time of Descartes, to ascertain or secure foundational principles that establish a criterion for certain knowledge or
truth in any intellectual discipline. Only foundational principles,
many believe, can save us from the one apparent alternative: the abyss
of relativism, uncertainty, and ultimately nihilism. 2 9 Foundational
theories include scientific theories of empirical verification and legal
theories that locate the foundational principles of legal knowledge in
the positive acts of government tribunals or in the conventional meth126. Cf M. DiILAS, RISE AND FALL 6 (Eng. trans. 1985) ("We had embarked on that course
characteristic of every revolution: inspired fervor directing a reckoning of accounts. The more
exalted the fervor, the more merciless the reckoning.").

127. See Posner, supra note 62 (on the relative success of economic analysis of law); Tushnet,
Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505,

515-16 (1986) (on the apparent institutionalization of the Critical Legal Studies movement in
law schools, at least as a matter of participation in symposia and workshops and possibly as a
matter of tokenism in faculty recruitment policies as well).
128. R.J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECrIVISM AND RELATIVISM, supra note 6, at 8-20.
129. See id. at 16-19.
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ods of argument and deliberation by these tribunals. 13' The new pluralism in legal scholarship, especially the contextual purposes and
methods, in effect attacks the previously accepted foundational principles of legal knowledge. The new pluralism may thus threaten not only
our traditional methods of inquiry, which emphasize the legal forms,
but also our belief in a distinct "legal expertise" based on a distinct
specialized knowledge. If there are no foundational principles for
legal knowledge, as the new scholarship suggests, how can there be a
distinct legal expertise that is isolated or separate from the knowledge
of other occupations?
Professor Bernstein suggests a route for escaping from the dilemma
of Cartesian anxiety. His approach may be attractive to many lawyers
and legal scholars if we could somehow relax our strong attachments
to the paradigm of formalist legal inquiry, the ideology of neutral and
objective law, and the related concept of an exclusive legal expertise.
Bernstein proposes that we move "beyond objectivism and relativism"
in matters of knowledge, and that intellectual work develop and maintain a pluralistic and dialogic search for pragmatic and contingent
truths, be these truths of social behavior, social theory, or the interpre3

tation of texts. 1

1

Unlike objectivism, Bernstein's pluralistic approach accepts the reasonableness or validity of reasoning from different paradigms of
inquiry that contain varying premises and methods. Unlike relativism,
which considers the adoption of any paradigm and its specific judgments to be merely a matter of taste, of politics, or of power, this pluralistic inquiry or dialogue remains open to several kinds of truths that
can be established by the interplay of competing paradigms or models
of intellectual inquiry.' 3 2 In some cases, the different paradigms may
converge to support a single best answer to a problem at a particular
time.' 33 In other cases, even though one cannot measure the specific
answers supported by different paradigms against a single criterion of
truth, we can compare the attractiveness of these different answers and
choose one by argument and reflection as the best answer to a problem
at a particular time. 134 In yet other cases, the dialogue of pluralism
130. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 87, at 6-11, 114-50; H.L.A. HART. THE CONCEPT OF

LAW 18-150 (1961).
See R.J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM, supra note 6, at 19-20.
132. See id. at 20-49.
133. Cf M. PERRY, supra note 80, at 109 (contending that "right answers" in constitutional
interpretation and law frequently represent "a point at which a variety of philosophical and
religious systems of moral thought and belief converge") (emphasis in original).
134. R.J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM. supra note 6. at 52-93.
131.

171-231.
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may not generate a best solution at a particular time, but the presence
of competing paradigms of inquiry may still improve our understanding of the paradigms and their different solutions to problems. Of
course, this pluralistic interplay may also undermine perceived truths
and theories and produce the unsettling experience of new patterns of
thought, scholarship, and practice. Pluralism promises instability as
well as stability..
Some recentiworks in legal philosophy and constitutional theory,
which emphasize the nature of adjudication, methods of legal argument, and theories of interpretation, appear to be predicated on pluralistic inquiry, or in other words, on a dialogical inquiry which is aimed
ultimately at the judicial construction of the best available answers to
specific issues. t3 We do not need to accept these particular theories to
appreciate the implications of Professor Bernstein's argument for the
reading, writing, and evaluation of contemporary scholarship. This
scholarship is based on several competing paradigms of inquiry which
lie at the heart of our current unease and fragmentation about the
nature and values of contemporary scholarship. To make the best of
our pluralistic world, we should be attentive to the pragmatic and contingent truths that are available if we are willing to consider pluralism
openly. To do this, we shall need to read, listen, imagine, converse,
and write about what these answers might be.136 We shall also need to
respect competing views in the sense that we remain willing to listen
and change our views in light of persuasive arguments. We cannot
afford exclusive attachments to the more comfortable unitary paradigms that may suit our personal or immediate political interests.
Law is politics, but legal scholarship should be more than politics,
should it not?

135. See P. BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (describing six alternative and
sometimes competing methods of constitutional argument); R. DWORKIN, supra note 87
(analyzing three competing conceptions of legal interpretation); W.F. MURPHY, J.E. FLEMING,
& W.F. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1986); M. PERRY, supra
note 80, at 91-162; Nelson, supra note 86.
136. Cf H.G. GADAMER, supra note 59, at 235-341 (describing the hermeneutical
experience, or the interpretation of texts, as a complex dialogue between readers, texts, and
previous interpretive traditions); Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute. 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 489, 492-501 (describing the 16th century English jurist Edmund Plowden's equitable
method of statutory interpretation, which involves a passive method of conversing with, and
listening for answers from, an imaginary lawmaker). But cf Rotunda, supra note 4, at 6
(asserting that law professors achieve their academic prominence on the basis of what they write
rather than what they read).
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